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UNHAPPY MEALS: SEX DISCRIMINATION IN TOY CHOICE
AT MCDONALD’S
IAN AYRES* & ANTONIA ROSE AYRES-BROWN**
This Essay reports on a commonplace form of sex discrimination
that we unsuccessfully challenged in a lawsuit before the Connecticut
Human Rights Commission. In a small-scale pilot study that we con-
ducted 5 years ago (which was the basis of our initial complaint) and
in a follow-up study conducted in 2013, we found that McDonald’s
franchises, instead of asking drive-through customers ordering a
Happy Meal about their toy preference, asked the customer for the sex
of the customer’s child (“Is it for a boy or a girl?”) and then gave dif-
ferent types of toys for each sex. Moreover, our 2013 visits found that
franchises treat unaccompanied children differently because of their
sex. In 92.9% of the visits, the stores, without asking the child about
her or his toy preference, just gave the toy that they had designated
for that sex. Moreover, 42.8% of stores refused to offer opposite-sex
toys even after the child reapproached the counter and affirmatively
asked for an alternative. In the most egregious instance, a girl, after
twice asking for a “boy’s toy,” was denied, even though the store a mo-
ment later had the “boy’s toy” in stock. These “fair counter” tests indi-
cate that stores use discriminatory default, altering, and mandatory
rules. They constitute strong prima facie evidence of disparate treat-
ment on the basis of sex in the terms and conditions of contracting
for a public accommodation. We also use our Happy Meal empiricism
as a motivating example to explore the proper limits of civil rights law.
While newspapers describing job listing as “male” or “female” have
been found to be a per se civil rights violation, describing Happy Meal
offerings as “boy’s toys” or “girl’s toys” may not, as a positive matter,
offend courts’ current notion of equality.
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INTRODUCTION
In the Fall of 2008, one of us (Antonia Ayres-Brown, who was then
11 years of age), wrote to Jim Skinner, the Chief Executive Officer of
McDonald’s Corporation, and asked him “to change [his] policy regard-
ing Happy Meals.”1 The letter stated, in part:
Every time I go to McDonalds [sic] and order a Happy Meal
through [the] drive through, McDonald’s employees ask me or
my parents whether we want a girls [sic] toy or a boys [sic] toy.
I believe that this could be potentially very hurtful to many kids,
because it is a way of restricting kids to stereotypes of what kids of
their gender should be interested in. It seems like kids would feel
hurt if they felt like a specific toy was supposed to only be used by
a different gender other than theirs. . . . Would it be legal for you
to ask at a job interview whether someone wanted a man’s job or
a woman’s job?
. . . .
I have a request. Would you please ask your stores to stop
asking the question “Would you like a boy’s toy, or would you like
a girl’s toy?”?2
On January 2, 2009, Anna received a response from a McDonald’s
Customer Satisfaction Representative suggesting that Anna’s expe-
rience was counter to McDonald’s express corporate policy: “when
we offer a Happy Meal with two different themes, our employees have
been specifically trained to ask customers which of the two toys offered
that week they would like, and not whether they would like a ‘girl’
toy or a ‘boy’ toy.” 3
1. Letter from Anna Ayres-Brown to Jim Skinner, Chief Executive Officer, McDonald’s
Corporation (undated) (on file with authors). McDonald’s first introduced Happy Meals in
1979. Kayla Webley, A Brief History of the Happy Meal, TIME (Apr. 30, 2010), http://content
.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1986073,00.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7YW
-S9N7; see also MCDONALD’S HAPPY MEALS TOYS A-Z, http://web.archive.org/web20101
125160353/http://collectorsconnection.com/mcdon.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/TSY7
-5YD3 (last visited Jan. 28, 2015) (listing past Happy Meal Toys).
2. Letter from Anna Ayres-Brown, supra note 1.
3. Letter from Donell M. Jaja, Customer Satisfaction Representative, McDonald’s
Corp., to Anna Ayres-Brown (Jan. 2, 2009) (on file with the authors).
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We were unsatisfied with this response because the claim that
employees were specifically trained not to ask customers “whether
they would like a ‘girl’ toy or a ‘boy’ toy” was inconsistent with our ex-
perience as McDonald’s customers.4 We undertook a small scale social
science study involving more than a dozen visits to McDonald’s out-
lets in the greater New Haven area and ultimately sued McDonald’s
before the Connecticut Human Rights Commission for discriminating
on the basis of sex in its offering and sale of Happy Meals.5
The Human Rights Commission dismissed our allegations as
“absurd” and “titillation or [a] sociological experiment.” 6 While we
readily concede that there are many more pernicious forms of dispa-
rate treatment, our goal in this Essay is to show that McDonald’s prac-
tices then and now raise important questions about discrimination in
contracting and about what the scope of our civil rights laws is and
ought to be.
The Essay is divided into five Parts. Part I reports the results of
our initial store visits in 2009. Part II describes the history of our
unsuccessful attempt to challenge McDonald’s conduct as disparate
treatment on the basis of sex. Part III reports the results of our 2013
store visits, including evidence of McDonald’s disparate treatment of
unaccompanied young boys and girls. Part IV relates these issues to
our nation’s history in ending gendered “help wanted” newspaper sec-
tions (e.g., labeled Help Wanted—Male and Help Wanted—Female).
Finally, Part V considers the propriety of “sex-segregated” marketing
in a variety of market settings.
I. THE 2008 STORE VISITS
In 2008, we visited the drive-through windows of ten New Haven-
area McDonald’s when the stores were offering either a Digi Sport™
electronic soccer game or a Hello Kitty™ electronic wrist watch as
toys.7 Through a speaker, Ian would order a Happy Meal with Chicken
4. Id.; see also infra Part I.
5. See infra Parts I, II.
6. Ayres, CHRO No. 0930361, at 2 (Conn. Comm’n on Human Rights and Oppor-
tunities 2009) (final agency action)[hereinafter Ayres, CHRO No. 0930361].
7. These drive-through visits represent the fourth time one of the authors has engaged
in “fair driving” empiricism (or what might be called, economists in cars testing for discrim-
ination). See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Nego-
tiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 817 (1991) (finding disparities in negotiated purchase
price) [hereinafter Fair Driving]; Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive
Conduct Standard for Assessing When Disparate Impacts are Unjustified, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 669, 696–98 (2007) (finding disparities in automobile finance charges); Ian Ayres
et al., To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613, 1616
(2005) (finding disparities in taxicab tipping); see also FAST FOOD TOYS & MORE, http://
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McNuggets and a Diet Coke. If the McDonald’s employee taking the
order asked a gendered question, Ian would respond by asking, “Why
do you ask?” This question provoked revealing reactions. In one case,
for example, an employee asked Ian, “Is it for a boy or for a girl?” and
after Ian posed this response question, the McDonald’s worker stated,
“We have two different toys for two different genders.”
Overall, we found at the drive-through that nine of the ten stores
asked whether the meal was “for a boy or for a girl.” One of the ten
stores asked whether we wanted “a boy’s toy or a girl’s toy.” None of
the visited McDonald’s followed the professed corporate policy of de-
scribing the toys themselves—as in asking, “Would you like a Digi
Sport soccer game or a Hello Kitty watch?” 8
At three of the McDonald’s, Anna also executed a complementary
“counter” test. While Ian was purchasing a Happy Meal at the drive-
through eleven-year-old Anna would approach the counter unaccom-
panied and order a Happy Meal. At each of these McDonald’s, Ian was
asked at the drive-through whether the meal was “for a boy or a girl,”
but Anna, while placing the same order, was not asked for a toy pref-
erence and given the Hello Kitty watch.
To gather more evidence, Ian also posted an item on the New
York Times Freakonomics blog, requesting information from readers
on their experiences ordering Happy Meal toys from McDonald’s.9 Ac-
cording to seventy nine reader responses, approximately one-fifth of
the time McDonald’s employees did not ask a toy-related question.10
But when employees did ask a toy-related question:
47.7% Asked “Is It for a Boy or Girl?”
31.8% Asked “Do You Want A Boy’s Toy or a Girl’s Toy?”
15.9% Described the toys in non-gender terms.11
The blog responses were broadly consistent with our personal experi-
ence in that only a small proportion of the respondents reported being
asked a non-gendered question, and in that the child’s sex was asked
more often than whether the child wanted a boy’s or girl’s toy.12
www.fastfoodtoys.net/mcdonalds%20hello%20kitty%20watches%202009%20digi
%20sports.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/Q4PJ-3REA (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
8. See FAST FOOD TOYS & MORE, supra note 7.
9. Ian Ayres, Our Daily Bleg: Happy Meal Toys, FREAKONOMICS BLOG (Feb. 11,
2009, 10:07 AM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2009/02/11/our-daily-bleg-happy-meal
-toys/, archived at http://perma.cc/9XSF-2TZE.
10. Ian Ayres, Print, Persuade and Post, FREAKONOMICS BLOG (Apr. 22, 2014,
11:32 AM) http://freakonomics.com/2014/04/22/print-persuade-and-post/, archived at http://
perma.cc/RN3L-JHPA [hereinafter Print, Persuade and Post].
11. Id.
12. Id.
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II. LITIGATION
A. Three Alleged Violations
In 2009 we filed a complaint before the Connecticut Commission
on Human Rights and Opportunities, claiming that McDonald’s res-
taurants violated our civil rights by engaging in sex discrimination
in public accommodations in violation of Connecticut law.13 While
there is no federal statute prohibiting sex discrimination in public
accommodations, Connecticut, like many other states, prohibits such
discrimination.14 The Connecticut Human Rights statute and regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to the statute make it illegal to be denied
“the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services or facilities offered
to the general public because of . . . sex . . . .” 15 In our complaint, we
claimed that we had encountered three types of Happy Meal dis-
crimination.16 We claimed that McDonald’s restaurants were
(1) discriminating in counter service by giving different toys
(without asking customer preference) based solely on the sex of
the customer or the customer’s child; (2) discriminating in drive-
thru service by asking whether the toy is for a boy or girl, and
giving a different toy based on the answer, and (3) discriminating
in drive-thru service by asking whether the customer prefers a
boy’s toy or a girl’s toy.17
The first claim merely concerns a default disparate treatment by
the store if the children customers can have the alternative toy by
just asking.18 In fact, Anna at times found that “just asking” was
insufficient. In one instance, after Anna had expressly asked a counter
employee for a “boy toy,” another employee nonetheless gave Anna the
13. Complaint, Ayres CHRO No. 0930361 (Conn. Comm’n on Human Rights and
Opportunities 2009) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Ayres-Brown Complaint].
14. As of 2000, there were 40 states that prohibited at least some forms of sexual
discrimination in public accommodations. Miriam A. Cherry, Exercising the Right to
Public Accommodations: The Debate Over Single-Sex Health Clubs, 52 ME. L. REV. 97,
118–19 (2000); see also Paula J. Finlay, Prying Open the Clubhouse Door: Defining the
“Distinctly Private” Club After New York State Club Association v. City of New York, 68
WASH. U.L.Q. 371, 382–83 (1990).
15. Public Accommodations/Service, CONNECTICUT COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
OPPORTUNITIES, http://www.ct.gov/chro/cwp/view.asp?a=2524&Q=315888&chroPNavCtr
=%7C, archived at perma.cc/SY5N-LAQ7 (last visited Jan. 28, 2015); accord CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West 2012).
16. Ayres-Brown Complaint, supra note 13, at 3.
17. Id.
18. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989) (explaining that the ‘would
have wanted’ approach to default selection is incomplete)[hereinafter Filling Gaps].
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Hello Kitty watch, saying to Anna, “I almost made a mistake and gave
you a boy’s toy.” If Anna had reiterated that she wanted the other toy,
she probably could have succeeded in securing her preferred toy. But
the complaint also raised the factual question of whether McDonald’s
employees also adopted discriminatory “altering rules.”19 An altering
rule specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for contracting
around a default.20 An altering rule can be discriminatory if these con-
ditions make it harder for girls than for boys to contract around a
default choice.21
The second and third claims relating to McDonald’s drive-through
policies raise more vexing problems of characterization. Unlike the dis-
criminatory counter default, the drive-through toy policy is a kind of
affirmative-choice rule.22 By default, McDonald’s resists including
any toy unless the customer affirmatively responds to a toy-choice
question.23 Unlike the counter claim, the drive-through claims are not
about a discriminatory default.24 Instead, the drive-through claims
force us to question whether aspects of McDonald’s drive-through
menus can give rise to civil rights concerns.25 Contract theory de-
scribes a menu as the disclosure of simultaneous offers.26 The three
different kinds of toy questions are oral menus that they represent dif-
ferent degrees of specificity in disclosing the toy alternatives:
FIGURE 1: SPECIFICITY SPECTRUM IN TOY CHOICE MENUS
“boy or girl?”       “boy’s toy or girl’s toy?” “Digi Sport or Hello Kitty?”
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low High
19. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE
L.J. 2032, 2032 (2012)[hereinafter Regulating Opt-Out].
20. Id. at 2036.
21. We return to these issues in Part III where we more directly test for the existence
of discriminatory default and altering rules. See infra Part III.
22. Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2099 (explaining affirmative choice rules).
23. Ian has tested this by responding to drive-through toy questions with sentences
such as “I’m not comfortable answering that kind of question.” Drive-through employees
tend to insist on customers making some kind of an affirmative choice before they com-
plete an order. The “affirmative-choice” default is a kind of penalty default that induces the
production of information. Filling Gaps, supra note 18, at, 97.
24. Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2045 (distinguishing between discriminatory
default and discriminating altering rules).
25. Id. at 2111.
26. See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3 (2006) [hereinafter Menus
Matter]; see also Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2049–50.
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1. Degree of Specificity in Describing Default Alternatives
The question “Is it for a boy or for a girl?” is the least specific in
describing the substantive alternatives. The question explicitly calls
for a specific piece of information, but the question on its face does not
indicate that the store’s toy selection is contingent upon the answer.
The “Do you want a boy’s or girl’s toy?” question is more specific be-
cause it makes clear that a toy selection is contingent on the answer.
The “Do you want a Digi Sport soccer game or Hello Kitty wrist
watch?” question is the most specific of the three because it most
clearly describes the menu alternatives being offered. The level of
specificity in describing the toy alternatives also impacts the level of
consumer control.27 The high-specificity question gives the consumer
the most control, while the “girl’s toy” question cedes to McDonald’s
the control over which toy is for, or more preferred for, children of a
particular gender.28 The “boy or girl” question is the least suggestive
of consumer control, as it implies that McDonald’s makes the choice of
toy contingent on the child’s gender.29
The toy questions also differ in suggesting different means for
consumers exercising their toy choice. Given that altering rules func-
tion as the means to select default alternatives, the different menus of
toy questions implicitly suggest different altering rules.30 When a con-
sumer is asked whether she wants the soccer game or wrist watch, the
natural means of indicating choice is to give a responsive answer mir-
roring the words of the question.31 Similarly, when a drive-through
employee asks whether the Happy Meal is “for a boy or for a girl,” the
employee is suggesting (at least to drivers who understand that Happy
Meals come, at times, with gendered toys) the verbal means that pa-
trons can use to opt for an alternative to the no toy default.32 This
toy question also suggests that “for a boy” and “for a girl” are the
expected responses.
Does the “for a boy or for a girl” question represent actionable
discrimination?33 On the one hand, the question on its face is not
27. Cf. Menus Matter, supra note 26, at 10 (explaining that the layout of menu choices
affect consumer choice).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2036; see also Yair Listokin, What Do
Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical Examination, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 279, 284 (2009) (analyzing altering menus in the context of corporate bylaws).
31. Willem J. M. Levelt & Stephanie Kelter, Surface Form and Memory in Question
Answering, 14 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 78, 78 (1982).
32. The absence of a toy is the default rule such that a customer must answer the
question in order to receive a toy, the alternative. See Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19,
at 2032 (explaining the term ‘altering rules’).
33. See id. at 2111–13 (explaining the elements required for actionable discrimination).
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about toy choice, but is simply asking for the sex of the consumer. If
some customers, perhaps unaware of the toy choice convention, pro-
vide naively truthful answers, then McDonald’s will treat these naïve
truth-tellers differently because of the sex of their children. The
framing of the oral menu exacerbates the risk of customer error
because customers are not adequately informed of what turns on
their response. An apartment rental agent who sought out online
applicants’ race and then treated reported races differently would
straightforwardly violate the Fair Housing Act, even if the appli-
cants were free to report any race initially.34
Even more sophisticated McDonald’s customers, who understand
that their answer will determine the included toy, may bear extra
costs because of the form of the altering rule.35 The suggestion is that
the parent of a boy must say that the Happy Meal is “for a girl” in
order to receive the Hello Kitty toy. Parents who have qualms about
misrepresenting the truth or are disinclined to assume the additional
burden of saying “It is for a boy, but I’d like the girl’s toy” will be
more likely to accept the gender-specific toy choice. The altering rule
is thus likely to disparately impact customers who want to choose
gender non-compliant toys.36
The third claim challenging the “boy’s toy or girl’s toy” question
raises perhaps the most challenging civil rights question. Here the
menu and suggested altering rules expressly concern toy choice, and
on their face, do not make toy selection contingent on the sex of the
consumer. Neither the menu nor the altering rules constitute tradi-
tional disparate treatment if customers understand that a girl can
order a boy’s toy (and vice versa).37 Nonetheless, the gendered framing
of the question raises serious civil rights concerns.38 As before, it is
possible that such altering rules create disparate impacts on ac-
count of sex.39 This could happen, for example, if girls were dispropor-
tionately likely to order non-conforming toys when asked to use a
gendered altering rule (relative to altering rules that describe the toy
choice in non-gendered terms).40
34. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(b) (West 2014).
35. See Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2032 (explaining altering rules); see also
infra Part III.
36. See Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2032; see also infra Part III.
37. There may be customers who might think that it would be lying to request a boy’s
toy if the consumer is a girl. For example, at some restaurants it would be lying to say one
wanted the child-size portion when the consumer is an adult because the child-size portions
are limited to consumers under a certain age.
38. See Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2111–12 (discussing civil rights concerns
regarding gender).
39. See id. at 2032; see also infra Part III.
40. See Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2032; see also infra Part III.
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But even without a disparate impact showing, one can imagine
challenging the menu and altering rules because they induce a kind
of cognitive disparate treatment in the customers themselves.41 Al-
tering rules force customers to think in terms of sexual categories
because individuals must comply with the suggested altering rule
by characterizing their preference as wanting a “boy’s toy” or “girl’s
toy.” 42 In Anna’s initial letter to the McDonald’s CEO, she asked,
“Would it be legal for you to ask at a job interview whether someone
wanted a man’s job or a woman’s job?”43 Most law professors and law
students might think that such a question would violate Title VII.44
But it is harder to pin down exactly why. Imagine a hypothetical
where Sears is accepting applications for salesmen and secretaries.
Applicants of either sex are free to apply for either type of job and
would have equal merit-based opportunity to receive either job. But
imagine that the application sought an applicant’s preference by
asking whether the applicant was interested in a “man’s job” or a
“woman’s job.” The employer’s form does not itself engage in dispa-
rate sexual treatment because the same form (that is, menu) is given
to all applicants and because the pool of applicants interested in a
particular job is hired independent of sex.45 The defendant would
argue, as in the McDonald’s case, that any applicant regardless of
his or her sex could apply (and be fairly considered) for either type
of job.46
A strong tradition in the common law is to view the offeror as
“master of [her] offer,” meaning that the offeror is free to place any
pre-conditions for acceptance that she wishes.47 Thus, an offeror is free
to specify that acceptance can only be accomplished by skywriting
in fifty-foot letters, “I accept.” 48 But Anna’s question suggests that
Title VII may limit the altering rule conditions that offerors might
place on their offers.49 An offer that can only be accepted by saying
41. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1161, 1247 (1995) (discussing the cognitive element of discrimination that leads to dis-
parate treatment).
42. See Regulating Opt-Out supra note 19, at 2032 (explaining altering rules); see
also infra Part III.
43. Letter from Anna Ayres-Brown, supra note 1.
44. See infra note 137; see also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e–2000e-17 (West 2014).
45. See infra Part V.
46. See infra note 137 (discussing McDonald’s possible arguments).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 30 (1981).
48. Id.
49. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2014).
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“Women do not deserve the right to vote” is troubling because it forces
accepting offerees to think and speak in gendered terms as a condi-
tion of contracting.50
The man’s job/woman’s job application form might easily be
challenged under disparate impact law, if plaintiffs could show that
the gendered altering rules produce unjustified disparate impacts in
job choice relative to more traditional job descriptions.51 But the more
interesting question is whether plaintiffs could challenge the form
(menu and associated altering rules) under a disparate treatment
theory.52 In fact, we will see below in Part III that several human
rights commissions and courts—including the Connecticut Supreme
Court—have done just that with regard to an analogous form of
advertisements.53 These tribunals found newspaper advertisements
that characterized job openings as “Help Wanted Male” and “Help
Wanted Female” as per se civil rights violations.54
B. McDonald’s Response
The Foxon Restaurant named in the complaint responded by
answering and sending the Commission a “Position Statement” 55
that presented three legal arguments why the complaint should be
dismissed. First, the respondent characterized the complaint as
“frivolous, [and] an improper and irresponsible use of this agency’s
resources.” 56 Its argument focused on Ian’s academic background:
This Complaint appears to be nothing more than an exercise in
intellectual curiosity by a Yale Law School professor . . . . As
part of his academic career, Mr. Ayers [sic] publishes articles on
the social experiments he conducts. . . . [I]t is clear that Mr. Ayers’
new social experiment involves free toys. Mr. Ayers’ experiment
is, however, an improper and irresponsible use of this Agency’s
resources. Had Complainant asked for a Digisports toy when she
50. See RESTATEMENT supra note 47 (explaining that the offeror can specify the manner
of acceptance).
51. See infra Part IV.
52. Fair Driving, supra note 7, at 820 (explaining disparate treatment).
53. See infra Part III.
54. Evening Sentinel v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 357 A.2d 498, 503-504 (1975); see also
infra Part III.
55.  Respondent’s Position Statement, Ayres, CHRO No. 0930361 (Conn. Comm’n on
Human Rights and Opportunities 2009). In turn, Anna Ayres-Brown filed a document
entitled, “Complainant’s Comments on Respondent R&K Spero McDonald’s Answer and
Position Statement.” Complainant’s Comments on Respondent R&K Spero McDonald’s
Answer and Position Statement, Ayres, CHRO No. 0930361, (Conn. Comm’n on Human
Rights and Opportunities 2009)[hereinafter Complainant’s Comments].
56. Position Statement, supra note 55, at 4.
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allegedly ordered the Happy Meal, Respondent would have given
her a Digisports toy. Or, had Mr. Ayers or Complainant walked
into the Foxon Restaurant and asked for a Digisports toy after
allegedly receiving a Hello Kitty toy, Respondent would have given
them a Digisports toy. . . . Mr. Ayers conveniently stopped his ex-
periment short to concoct this case. Instead of taking two minutes
to ask for a different toy, Mr. Ayers now has this Agency spend
countless hours sorting through a frivolous Complaint to indulge
his intellectual curiosity.57
Second, respondent claimed that “complainant was never denied
any good,” and the complaint is, “therefore, legally deficient.” 58 This
argument turned on a close reading of Connecticut’s public accom-
modations statute:
Even accepting Complainant’s allegations as true, which Respon-
dent does not, the Complaint itself demonstrates that Complainant
was never denied any good. The claims are, therefore, legally defi-
cient. Connecticut’s public accommodations statute reads:
(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section:
(1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this
state full and equal accommodations in any place of
public accommodation, resort or amusement because
of . . . sex . . .
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-64(a)(l) . . . . Respondent could not
have denied Complainant a Digisports toy because Complainant
admits that she never requested a Digisports toy. Had Complain-
ant initially asked Respondent for a Digisports toy or asked to ex-
change the Hello Kitty toy for a Digisports toy, Respondent would
have happily given her the toy she requested.59
Finally, Respondent claimed that the alleged actions of its em-
ployees would not constitute a “denial of goods based on gender.” 60 In
discussing this claim, the Respondent went furthest in elaborating its
theory of the scope of discrimination in public accommodations:
Complainant asks this Agency to interpret Connecticut’s public
accommodations statute as prohibiting businesses from making
57. Id. Respondent failed to mention that Anna also has published social science experi-
ments. See Ian Ayres, Antonia Ayres-Brown & Henry Ayres-Brown, Seeing Significance:
Is the 95% Probability Range Easier to Perceive?, 20 CHANCE 11, 11 (2007).
58. Respondent’s Position Statement, supra note 55, at 5.
59. Id. at 5–6 (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
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any assumption about a customer’s potential preferences based
on gender.
Not only is this interpretation divorced from the plain reading
of the statute (which only prohibits the denial of goods based on
gender), but it makes no sense practically. Under Complainant’s
proposed reading, department stores would run afoul of the law by
keeping dresses and skirts only in women’s sections or carrying
blouses only in women’s sizes.
Cosmetic companies could be sued if their employees failed to offer
a splash of perfume (marketed specifically to women) to men pass-
ing by in the mall. Clothing retailers could no longer organize their
websites to differentiate between men’s and women’s apparel. In
each of these scenarios, a business makes an assumption about
which products its customers may prefer based on his or her gen-
der. Yet, none of these assumptions prevents a customer from
asking for or receiving any good based on their gender. Just as
department stores do not prohibit young women from purchasing
jeans kept in the men’s clothing section, the Complaint never al-
leges that Respondent prevented Complainant from asking for
or receiving a Digisports toy. . . .
For operational efficiency, among other reasons, businesses
make assumptions about gender preferences based on consumer
behavior and purchasing trends. For example, men typically do
not purchase dresses. Therefore, separating women’s dresses from
men’s slacks saves clothing stores from expending resources to
help female customers locate dresses among racks full of clothing
marketed to men. Mr. Ayers acknowledges this much in his [blog
post]: “McDonald’s has to balance giving detailed information
about toy promotions that change every few weeks against the dif-
ficulties of training and wanting to keep the line moving.” Making
an assumption about a customer’s potential preferences (by, for
example, designating one toy a “boy” toy or a “girl” toy) based on
general consumer behavior and purchasing trends does not vio-
late Connecticut’s public accommodations statute. The statute
prevents businesses from denying a customer a good based on his
or her gender. Complainant makes no such allegation and, accord-
ingly, the Complaint must be dismissed.61
A comment Anna filed in response to McDonald’s “Position
Statement” argued that the restaurant had interpreted the Connect-
icut Public Accommodation statute too narrowly:
Connecticut law protects me not only from being denied a good on
the basis of sex (as [Respondent] argues), the statute also protects
61. Id. at 6–7 (emphasis omitted).
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me from being denied “full and equal accommodations . . . because
of sex.” When [the store] gave me a “girl” toy at the counter on
February 6 solely because of my sex, it denied me full and equal
accommodations because of sex. And when [the store] forced my
father to state my toy preference in terms of sex (“for a boy”) in
order to receive the Digisports toy, it again denied me full and
equal accommodations because of sex. It is not necessary that
[the store] denied me a good or service altogether in order to have
violated the public accommodation statute. By needlessly high-
lighting gender when it ought to have nothing to do with Happy
Meal toys, [the store] conditioned a public accommodation on sex,
and this violates the Connecticut statute.62
Our comment at best indirectly responded to the store’s discussion
of department stores, cosmetic companies and clothing retailers, by
asking the Commission to imagine an alternative hypothetical:
If the Foxon restaurant classified Diet Coke as a “white person’s
beverage” and Iced Tea as a “black person’s beverage” based on
marketing and sales data, this practice would be offensive and
would deny customers full and equal accommodation because of
race—even if [the restaurant] allowed white customers to request
a “black person’s beverage” in order to get an iced tea, or African-
American customers to request a “white person’s beverage” in
order to get a diet coke. According to [the restaurant’s] misread-
ing of the statute, however, this race-based practice would not
violate the statute because African-Americans would be free to ob-
tain diet cokes—they would just have to resist [the restaurant’s]
race-based classification and ask for a diet coke by name or use
[the restaurant’s] raced-based terms and ask for a “white per-
son’s beverage.” [The restaurant’s] would not be denying African-
American customers the ability to purchase diet cokes, but they
would be imposing race-based classifications on their customers,
and this would deny their customers full and equal accommoda-
tion. When [the restaurant] describes Happy Meal toys in terms
of gender (“boy toy” or “girl toy”) rather than the actual character
of the toy (“Digisports” or “Hello Kitty”), [the restaurant] need-
lessly imposes a sex-based classification on its customers, just
as it would impose a race-based burden if it characterized soft
drinks in terms of race. Either practice violates the Connecticut
public accommodation statute.63
With the issues thus joined, the matter went next to the Commission
for a decision to investigate or dismiss.64
62. Complainant’s Comments, supra note 55, at 3.
63. Complainant’s Comments, supra note 55, at 3; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64
(2012).
64. Ayres, CHRO No. 0930361, supra note 6, at 1.
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C. The Commission’s Decision
On September 15, 2009, the Connecticut Commission on Human
Rights and Opportunities summarily dismissed our complaint
without an investigation.65 The Commission’s unpublished decision
letter accepted several of the Respondent’s factual claims and legal
theories.66 It was also, in more than one sense, dismissive:
It is not the business of the Commission to engage its resources for
the purposes of titilation [sic] or sociological experiment.
Complainants’ assertion that respondent violated complain-
ants’ civil rights or denied complainants public accommodation or
services on the basis of sex is absurd. Respondent did not deny
complainants a Happy Meal toy. Respondent offers its customers
two Happy Meal toys. Respondent did not require complainant to
accept the Happy Meal it offered complainant. All complainants
had to do was exchange the Happy Meal toy that respondent gave
to Anna Ayres-Brown for the one Anna wanted. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Respondent also acknowledges in its response to the Com-
plainants’ Commission complaint that to the extent any respon-
dent employee asked complainants whether the Happy Meal toy
was for a boy or for a girl, it was contrary to respondent’s policies
and training. To require any more of respondent or the Commis-
sion under the facts complained of is not reasonable or necessary.67
Although the statute gave us leave to appeal the decision and receive
de novo review from a state trial court,68 we were somewhat chastened
by our decisive defeat before the Commission, and we chose to pursue
other endeavors during the intervening years, including junior high.
III. THE 2013 STORE VISITS
With the passage of time, our defeat became less stinging. In the
late summer of 2013, it occurred to us that by visiting some more
stores, we could improve the quality of our empiricism in two impor-
tant ways. First, with the help of four family friends, ages seven to
eleven, we visited fifteen McDonald’s restaurants and conducted more
traditional tests of disparate treatment—that is, those more akin to
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2–3.
67. Id.
68. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-83(f), 46a-104a (2014); see also Mehdi v. Comm’n on
Human Rights & Opportunities,74 A.3d 493, 495 (Conn. App. Ct., 2013) (“The court
conducted a de novo review of the defendant’s determination to dismiss the plaintiff’s
complaint.”).
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“fair housing” or “fair driving” tests of discrimination.69 Before entering
the store we would flip a coin to determine whether a boy or girl would
enter first. This child would go to the counter and order a Happy Meal
to go. The child would take note of whether the employee asked them
a question concerning what type of toy he or she would like, and if so,
how the question was phrased. A second child of the opposite sex
would enter the store either two minutes later or after two to three
customers entered the store.70 The second child would repeat the same
procedure. This would allow a direct test of default discrimination.71
Instead of testing whether McDonald’s treated a father at a drive-
through differently than a daughter at the counter, we tested whether
McDonald’s restaurants treated similarly situated customers differ-
ently because of their sex. More specifically, we could test whether,
without asking, stores simply gave boys and girls different types of
toys or asked them different types of questions.
Second, we improved the quality of our empiricism to respond to
one of McDonald’s earlier criticisms.72 The Respondent’s 2008 Position
Statement criticized our complaint allegations for failing to pro-
actively ask for an alternative toy.73 As noted earlier, in describing our
earlier visits, McDonald’s argued that “Mr. Ayers [sic] conveniently
stopped his experiment short to concoct this case. Instead of taking
two minutes to ask for a different toy, Mr. Ayers now has this Agency
spend countless hours sorting through a frivolous Complaint to in-
dulge his intellectual curiosity.” 74
Our 2013 visits directly respond to this concern by having the chil-
dren more affirmatively attempt to secure the toy which McDonald’s
designated for the opposite gender. Thus, for example, if one of our
boys was asked for his toy preference, he would respond by asking
for the “girl’s toy.” More importantly, if the second child to enter the
store failed to initially receive his or her preferred opposite-gender toy,
he or she would return to the counter and ask, “Do you have any other
types of toys?” and attempt to obtain the toy for the opposite gender.
By proactively “taking two minutes to ask for a different toy,” 75 our
69.  Fair Driving, supra note 7, at 845, 859–60; see also Teresa Coleman Hunter & Gary
L. Fischer, Fair Housing Testing—Uncovering Discriminatory Practices, 28 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1995).
70. The purpose of the delay was to reduce the chance that employees would be alerted
to the test. An adult known to the children would also enter the store or keep visual eye
contact on the children during the store visit, but the children were trained not to acknowl-
edge the presence of each other or of the adult.
71. Fair Driving, supra note 7, at 820, 859–60.
72. Position Statement, supra note 55, at 6.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id.
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children could directly test whether McDonald’s altering rules were
discriminatory—that is, whether McDonald’s artificially impeded the
ability of children to receive the kind of toy that McDonalds’ has
designated for the opposite sex.76
We visited stores during a time when two branded groups of toys
were being offered: “Power Ranger” (Megaforce) toys that were fre-
quently designated by drive-through employees as “for boys” and
Justice clothing store toys that were frequently designated by drive-
through employees as “for girls.” 77 Fourteen of the fifteen stores we
visited had both types of toys in stock. The Power Ranger toys in-
cluded sharks, tigers and snakes that could be transformed, if com-
bined together, into “Mechazords.” 78 The Justice toys included friend
bracelets, mini-locker clips, and fashion designer notebooks.79
Here is what we found in 2013:
1. Fair Counter Testing
In our thirty counter tests, only twice (once for a boy and once for
a girl) were the children asked whether they wanted a “boy’s toy” or
a “girl’s toy.” For the other twenty eight purchases, the children were
not asked any question about toy preference. The Foxon store was one
of the stores that failed to ask both the boy and the girl about their toy
preferences. This omission of a toy preference question contradicts the
2009 claim that “[the manager] trains Foxon Restaurant employees
to ask customers whether they want a ‘boy’ toy or a ‘girl’ toy, regard-
less of whether the customer orders the Happy Meal at the drive-thru
or inside at the restaurant counter.” 80
Excluding the one store that was out of Power Ranger toys, we
found pervasive evidence of default discrimination. 92.9% of the time
(twenty-six out of twenty-eight purchases) where the store had in
stock both toy types, the store, without asking, simply gave the child
the type of toy that McDonald’s had designated for that child’s gender:
girls, without being asked, were given a Justice toy, and boys, without
being asked, were given a Power Ranger toy. Default discrimination
by itself might violate the “full and equal accommodation” statutory
76. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64; Fair Driving, supra note 7, at 817, 859–60.
77. Antonia Ayres-Brown, McDonald’s Gave Me the “Girl’s Toy” With My Happy Meal.
So I Went to the CEO. SLATE MAG. (Apr. 21, 2014, 8:37 AM) [hereinafter Ayres-Brown,
Went to the CEO) http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/04/21/mcdonald_s_and_me
_my_fight_to_end_gendered_happy_meal_toys.html, archived at http://perma.cc/27S3
-UT2U.
78. Power Rangers & Justice, HAPPY MEAL TOYS COLLECTION FAN SITE, http://hm
.toysaffair.com/2013/08/happy-meal-toys-power-rangers-megaforce-justice.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/ZEU8-VTVP (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
79. Id.
80. Position Statement, supra note 55, at 5.
2015] UNHAPPY MEALS 253
mandate81: for children who prefer a Power Ranger toy, girls would be
forced to exert more effort than boys to acquire one because of their
sex. And among children who are similarly situated in preferring a
Justice toy, boys would have to exert more effort than girls because of
their sex.
But still we imagine that McDonald’s would argue that the harm
of this disparate default treatment is de minimis because any child
could, by simply asking, receive the toy that McDonald’s had desig-
nated for the opposite gender.82 This “just ask” defense is buttressed
by the presence of visual displays with examples of that month’s
Power Ranger and Justice toys (without gender designations) in thir-
teen of the fifteen visited stores. In these stores, customers had some
notice that another type of toy was being offered. But in the other two
stores—at which no child was asked for his or her toy preference and
there was no display—it is more unreasonable to require the customer
to proactively ask for an unoffered toy because the customer has less
reason to know that an alternate toy is available.
To respond to McDonald’s argument that our 2008 visits “conve-
niently stopped [the] experiment short to concoct this case,” 83 we had
one child at each store approach the counter again if the child found
the store initially gave the toy McDonald’s had designated for that
child’s toy—so our boys would reapproach the counter if they were
initially given a Power Ranger toy and our girls would reapproach the
counter if they were initially given a Justice toy. As noted above, this
default discrimination occurred in the vast majority of visits.84
In nine of these counter reapproaches (by five girls and four boys),
the child held out the toy (still wrapped in plastic) he or she had ini-
tially been given and asked, “Do you have any other toys?” At two of
these stores, an employee declined to offer any other toys in response
to requests from two boys.
At two other stores, an employee offered toys that included
opposite-sex toys in response to requests from one boy and one girl. At
the remaining five stores, an employee offered additional toys, but he
only included toys that McDonald’s had designated for the sex of the
requesting child in response to requests from one boy and four girls.
At these five stores, the children asked a follow-up question.
Three of the children (two girls and one boy) reiterated the “do you
have any other toys?” question. Employees refused to offer any other
toys to these children. Two of the girls followed up their initial
81. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (2012).
82. See, e.g., McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing de
minimis treatment).
83. Position Statement, supra note 55, at 4.
84. One store did not have Power Ranger toys.
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question by asking if the store had a “boy’s toy” and were offered
opposite-sex toys.
In five separate visits (by five girls), the child in the first re-
approach to the counter asked if the store had any “boy’s toys”
rather than “do you have any other toys?” In four of these cases, a
McDonald’s employee offered a Power Ranger toy to a girl. However,
in one of these five cases, which we discuss more fully below,85 the
McDonald’s employee refused to offer a Power Ranger toy.
We can assess the extent to which the stores impeded the ability
of children to opt out of McDonald’s default discrimination.86 As sum-
marized in Table 1, the children’s preference for opposite-gender toys
was frustrated in two different ways. First, 42.8% of the children were
unable to obtain their desired opposite-gender toy. The refusals to the
follow-up question “are there any other toys?” were telling. Most often
the final answer was simply “no.” An example of a more detailed re-
sponse was “no, that’s the only kind we have,” offered despite the fact
that the store had in stock opposite-gender toys. In one case, the
worker offered the opaque excuse, “No, we don’t because we only open
one box per Happy Meal.” 87
Second, some children faced the frustration of having to make
repeated requests. 35.7% of the children were forced to expend extra
effort by asking twice. These children were shown additional toys after
their initial request, but they were additional same-gender toys,
which, under our protocol, prompted the children to ask again whether
there were any other toys available. To be clear, 21.4% of children
experienced both types of frustration in having to ask twice and then
being denied (71.4% of our children experienced at least one of these
forms of frustration).
TABLE 1: TWO DIMENSIONS OF HARM: REFUSED ACCESS AND
ADDITIONAL EFFORT BY GENDER
Store Visits with
Counter Returns Refusals
Forced to
Ask Twice
Girl 10 30% 60%
Boy 4 75% 25%
Total 14 42.8% 50.0%
85. See infra text accompanying note 105.
86. See Fair Driving, supra note 7, at 866–67.
87. Under some interpretations, this answer may constitute a misrepresentation. In one
instance when a girl asked “May I have a boy’s toy please?,” the worker returned with a
boy’s toy as well as another girl’s toy.
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Table 1 also shows that boys were more likely than girls to have
their request refused, but girls were more likely than boys to have
to ask a second time. Store employees refused requesting boys 75% of
the time, while they refused requesting girls 30% of the time. In con-
trast, stores forced 60% of girls to ask a second time (before refusing
or granting their request), but only forced 25% of boys to ask a
second time.
Another way to analyze the results is to examine McDonald’s
response to specific kinds of requests. In visits where children never
made an explicitly gendered request, the probability that children
would ultimately be offered their desired opposite-gender toy was only
28.5% (two out of seven store visits). But in visits where children
made an explicitly gendered request (either on the first or second
time), the probability that children would be offered their desired
opposite-gender toy was 85.7% (six out of seven store visits).
These numbers suggest that for girls to expressly ask for a “boy’s
toy” is often sufficient to be offered that kind of toy.88 Is it reasonable
for McDonald’s to de facto require children to ask gendered questions
before they can receive their desired toy? If so, how are children sup-
posed to know that this is the necessary language? The hackneyed
query “What does a person have to do to get a drink in this place?”
(which itself is sometimes expressed in a cruder and more gendered
form) is centrally a request to learn about the establishment’s altering
rules, the minimal necessary conditions for opting around the no-
drink default.89
Sometimes we even found that a girl expressly asking for a “boy’s
toy” was insufficient. Our most egregious visit occurred at the McDon-
ald’s store on 250 Whalley Avenue in New Haven. In New Haven a
girl who initially ordered a Happy Meal was asked by a McDonald’s
employee, “Would you like the girl’s toy?” The girl responded, “No,
could I have the boy’s toy?” The employee took the girl’s money and
handed her a Happy Meal container. When the girl a moment later
opened the container, she learned that an employee had, notwith-
standing the girl’s explicit request, given her a Justice toy. The girl
went back to the counter with the unopened Justice toy and requested,
“May I have a boy’s toy please?” The same McDonald’s employee took
the girl’s Justice toy, then came back and said, “There are only girl’s
88. It is possible that the children could have asked another kind of question (for
example, explicitly asking for a Justice or Power Ranger toy), but this too would have
required the children to have knowledge of the toys currently being offered. As noted above,
about 13% of the stores failed to have in store displays. Moreover, in our drive-through
tests, discussed infra, we found that 38.5% of McDonald’s employees could not accurately
describe both types of toys when asked.
89. See Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2032 (describing altering rules).
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toys.” We then immediately sent an adult male into the store to check
to see if there were in fact no more Power Ranger toys. This adult con-
sumer on ordering a Happy Meal was asked by a McDonald’s em-
ployee, “Is it for a boy or for a girl?” The adult responded “for a boy”
and was given a Power Ranger toy.
The experience of this girl is inconsistent with the statutorily
mandated “full and equal accommodations.” 90 She twice expressly
asked for a boy’s toy to no avail. It is likely in this example that a
McDonald’s employee intentionally lied to a young girl because of her
sex. A bit like the Seinfeld Soup Nazi, this employee effectively de-
cided, “No boy’s toy for you!” 91
Overall, the findings of our 2013 store visits are at least strongly
suggestive of three kinds of discrimination. First, the store used dis-
criminatory defaults with impeding altering rules.92 In 92.9% of the
visits, the stores, without asking the child about her or his toy pref-
erence, just gave the toy that they had designated for that sex. Thus,
in the vast majority of the counter visits, the stores by default dis-
criminate on the basis of sex in the provision of Happy Meal toys. The
McDonald’s Position Statement suggested that such disparate treat-
ment might be non-cognizable because the subjects of the discrimi-
nation could, by simply asking, opt for the other kinds of toys.93 But
at the counter, our children visitors often found that simply asking
was insufficient in that they were refused with a 42.8% probability
and were forced to ask multiple times with a 50.0% probability. More
than 70% of the time, simply asking wasn’t insufficient to obtain an
opposite-gender toy.
Second, the store used discriminatory altering rules.94 Table 1 also
suggests that the stores applied different altering rules to children
of different sexes.95 Boys who asked, “Are there any other toys?,” were
more likely be denied. On the other hand, girls were more likely to be
offered additional “same-sex” toys and thus would be forced to ask
repeatedly for an opposite-gender toy.
Lastly, the store used discriminatory mandatory rules.96 The
egregious example in which the girl was twice refused after twice
90. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (2012).
91. “The Soup Nazi,” SEINFELD QUOTES, http://www.pkmeco.com/seinfeld/nazi.htm,
archived at, http://perma.cc/8MX2-9TY5 (saying “no soup for you!”).
92. Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2111–13.
93. This argument is similar to an argument advanced by Bernie Black that sophis-
ticated actors can easily contract around corporate law defaults. Bernard S. Black, Is
Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 562
(1990); see also Position Statement, supra note 55.
94. Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2036.
95. See supra Table 1.
96. Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2084 (describing mandatory rules).
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asking for a “boy’s toy” implies that there is some chance—in our
sample, 14.3%—that even if a child expressly requests a “boy’s toy”
or a “girl’s toy,” McDonald’s employees will still refuse the service of
offering the child the kind of toy it gives, by default, to boys. Of course,
there might have been as yet undiscovered magic words that would
have been sufficient to secure the opposite-gender toy. But at some
point, it is more reasonable to describe the experience not merely as
a discriminatory default with impeding altering rules but rather as a
discriminatory mandatory rule.97
Taken together, the comparative experience of our thirty pur-
chases at just fifteen McDonald’s stores is probative of a troubling
pattern—one of disparate treatment on the basis of sex in the coun-
ter sales of Happy Meals to unaccompanied children.
2. Drive-Through Tests
At the same fifteen stores, an adult male would do a complemen-
tary test at the drive-through. In one instance the employee did not
ask a question that implicated toy choice at all. In the other fourteen
drive through visits, the employee on the electronic voice transmission
system always asked for the sex of customer’s child either by asking
“Is this for a boy or for a girl?” or “Boy or girl?” And in all but two of
these child-gender questions, “boy” came before “girl.” In no instances
did the employee, after taking the order, initially describe the toys in
gender-neutral terms (as was the claimed policy in the original re-
sponse from McDonald’s Customer Satisfaction Representative),98 nor
did the employee ever ask whether the adult wanted a “boy’s toy or
girl’s toy” (as was the claimed policy in the 2008 Position Statement).99
The stark prevalence of the “boy or girl” query is consistent with our
2008 experience in which 90% of visited stores asked the more extreme
customer gender question to allocate toys.
In our drive-through protocol, the adult would respond to the
employee’s gender question (“For a boy or for a girl?”) by asking, in
response, “Why do you ask?” The employee responses often related
choice of toy explicitly to the child’s gender:
“ ’cause we have toys for girls and toys for boys”; “sir, because we
have a girl’s toy and a boy’s toy”; and “because we have both toys.”
One employee suggested that asking the question was a condition
of employment (“It’s my job.”).
97. At some point, the difference between a discriminatory default with an impeding
altering rule and a discriminatory mandatory rule is academic. See Regulating Opt-Out,
supra note 19, at 2113.
98. Letter from Donell M. Jaja, supra note 3.
99. See Position Statement, supra note 55, at 3.
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The drive-through protocol then had the adult customer ask, “Can
you describe the actual toys?” In the thirteen cases in which this
question elicited an on-topic response, the boy’s toy was accurately de-
scribed. In only nine of these cases, however, was the girl’s toy accu-
rately described. Example of this disparity included: “Some kinds of
Power Rangers, some kinds of things” and “We got a Power Rangers,
or the other one.”
Overall, the description of the girl’s toy was less specific in five
cases, while the description of the boy’s toy was never less descriptive.
Furthermore, in three of the five cases in which the girl’s description
was less specific, the drive-through infrastructure also lacked a dis-
play that showed the current toys. In these cases, it would be impossi-
ble for McDonald’s customers to know anything about the toy intended
for girls even if they expressly ask for a description of the offered toys.
We also found that when describing both toys, the boy’s toy (Power
Ranger) was always described before the girl’s toy (Justice).
Finally, at the pick-up window, we would ask why the toy was
meant for the gender it was allotted to. For instance, we asked, “Why
is the Justice toy meant for girls?” Of the fourteen times we had a
chance to ask this question, six of them were met with a refusal to an-
swer or an avoidance of giving a reason. An example of this response
is “Actually, I don’t know.” Two responses included reasons unassoci-
ated with gender, such as “That’s just the way they come; they send
them.” Some of the explanations arguably deployed gender stereo-
types: “ ’cause it’s pink”; “ ’cause it has girl’s stuff, like bracelets”; and
referring to Power Rangers: “they’re more mechanical; they separate.”
Overall, the results of 2008 and 2013 drive-through visits tell a
consistent story. Despite the stated policy of McDonald’s and the Posi-
tion Statement of its franchisee, McDonald’s drive-through employees
frequently fail to ask customers any explicit toy preference question.100
Instead, employees ask to learn the identity of the customer’s child’s
gender. The store’s provision of a toy type, in short, is contingent on
the sex of the child reported by the customer.
IV. SEX-SEGREGATED ADVERTISING AS PER SE DISCRIMINATION
The results of the 2013 counter tests described provide compelling
evidence of potentially actionable disparate treatment in public accom-
modations.101 Even the current practice of eliciting information about
the sex of the customer’s child at the drive-through, as discussed
above,102 raises serious questions of sex-based treatment—both be-
cause uninformed consumers who do not understand that the question
100. Contra Position Statement, supra note 55, at 3.
101. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64.
102. See supra Part III.
2015] UNHAPPY MEALS 259
concerns toy choice will be treated differently based on the sex of
their children, and because even those customers who know that the
question relates to toy choice might not know how to ask for the other
toy (without misrepresenting their child’s sex). Even though we did
not uncover current evidence of stores asking whether drive-through
customers preferred a “boy’s toy” or “girl’s toy,” the past and possible
future use of this kind of question raises the same issue: does the
prohibition of sex discrimination include the prohibition of this kind
of gendered framing?103
In this Part, we take the first step toward answering the
“gendered framing” question by discussing a context where an anal-
ogous question was litigated.104 Anna’s question of whether using
“men’s” or “women’s” descriptors for jobs violates civil rights law
was, in fact, repeatedly and definitively litigated before a number of
human and civil rights commissions during the early 1970s.105 At
issue in these cases was whether newspapers could run advertise-
ments under “sex-segregated employment headings.”106 For exam-
ple, in 1969, the National Organization of Women filed a complaint
with the Commission on Human Relations for the City of Pittsburgh,
charging the Pittsburgh Press with violating the city’s human rela-
tions ordinance by allowing employers to place advertisements under
“ ‘Help-Wanted Female’ ” and “ ‘Help-Wanted Male’ ” columns.107 The
Commission found that there was a “necessary implication of the
segregated columns . . . that men are given preference for jobs in one
set of columns, and women are given preference for jobs in the other
set.”108 It joined other commissions in finding “gender-segregated
column[s] unlawful per se.”109
The Commission held that sex-segregated framing constituted
discrimination, even though the Pittsburgh Press printed the follow-
ing disclaimer:
Notice to job seekers. Jobs are arranged under male and female
classifications for the convenience of our readers. This is done
because most jobs generally appeal more to persons of one sex than
the other. Various laws and ordinances—local, state, and federal,
prohibit discrimination in employment because of sex, unless sex
103. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 287 A.2d 161,
174 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972).
104. See id. at 171.
105. See Note, Discrimination in Classified Advertising—Pittsburgh Press Company
v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 38 ALB. L. REV. 847, 862–63 (1974).
106. See Elizabeth Boyer, Help-Wanted Advertising—Everywoman’s Barrier, 23
HASTINGS L.J. 221, 223–24 (1971).
107. Note, supra note 105, at 847.
108. Pittsburgh Press, 287 A.2d at 174 (Crumlish, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
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is a bona fide occupational requirement. Unless the advertisement
itself specifies one sex or the other, job seekers should assume that
the advertiser will consider applicants of either sex in compliance
with the laws against discrimination.110
Thus, while the disclaimer suggested that job seekers could apply for
any job, the mere gendered framing of some jobs that “generally ap-
peal more to persons of one sex than another” was deemed to be
discrimination per se.111
The trial and appellate courts reviewing the Commission’s deci-
sion took for granted that the segregated headings constituted discrim-
ination,112 relying in part on a 1968 Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission guideline that announced a similar characterization:
It is a violation of Title VII for a help-wanted advertisement to
indicate a preference, limitation, specification or discrimination
based on sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for
the particular job involved. The placement of advertisements in
columns . . . headed “Male” or “Female” will be considered an ex-
pression of preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination
based on sex.113
While there was social science evidence suggesting that sex-segregated
advertisements had a disparate impact,114 the courts and especially
the human rights commissions were comfortable prohibiting the
gendered framing independent of its discriminatory effects.115 In
110. Id. at 165.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 175 (Crumlish, J., dissenting) (“The Commission’s opinion and findings
of fact do not substantiate their position that gender-segregated advertising is an unlawful
employment practice.”).
113. Boyer, supra note 106, at 224.
114. Dr. Sandra Bem, from the Carnegie-Mellon University Department of Psychology,
testified before the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations about a study she con-
ducted indicating that “segregated want ads discourage women from seriously consid-
ering those jobs which are classified as Male-Interest.” See Note, supra note 105, at 860.
As Dr. Bern noted:
When the jobs were segregated and labeled on the basis of sex only 46% of the
women were as likely to apply for the Male-Interest jobs as for the Female-
Interest jobs. When the same jobs appeared in an integrated alphabetical
listing with no reference to sex 81% of the women preferred the Male-
Interest jobs to the Female-Interest jobs.
Id. at 860–61. Dr. Bem’s study is available. Id. at 860; see also Hailes v. United Air
Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1972) (male plaintiff “reasonably believed that
any job application” to defendant airline in response to its ad for “stewardesses” in “Help
Wanted—Female” column of newspaper “would be futile”).
115. The litigation instead focused on whether the discrimination language was nonethe-
less justified as a bona fide occupational qualification or whether the statutory prohibition,
as applied, violated the newspaper’s free speech rights. The latter question was ultimately
resolved when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the order barring “ ‘all
reference to sex in employment advertising column headings.’ ” Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
2015] UNHAPPY MEALS 261
affirming the Commission’s Pittsburgh Press decision, the Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania concluded:
When the Pittsburgh Press arbitrarily arranges and publishes
such column headings it is aiding in sex discrimination. The ruling
that employment want ad column headings be written asexually
is appropriate because it eliminates the difficulties of evaluating
sophisticated medical, sociological, and actuarial theories of aggre-
gate differences between the sexes. It is proper because it repre-
sents the highest degree of societal commitment to the ideal of
legal sexual equality.116
This Pittsburgh Press decision parallels the 1975 ruling of the
Connecticut Supreme Court finding that “sex-classification in help-
wanted advertising constitutes a per se violation” of Connecticut
law.117 In that case, the Evening Sentinel appealed an order from the
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunity to plain-
tiffs to “cease and desist the use of segregated columns for classified
employment based on sex.”118 The same commission that dismissed
our claims concerning “boy’s toy’s and girl’s toy” had, over thirty years
earlier, found that segregating help-wanted advertisements catego-
ries (Help Wanted Male, Help Wanted Female, and Help Wanted
Male/Female) was discriminatory even though job-seekers remained
free to apply to jobs listed in any category.119 In upholding the Commis-
sion’s order, the Connecticut Supreme Court reasoned:
It is part of a policy to eliminate sex-discrimination in its subtle
as well as overt forms. The very act of classifying individuals by
means of criteria irrelevant to the ultimate end sought to be
accomplished operates in a discriminatory manner. . . . 
Symbolic discrimination as in the instant case is every bit as
restrictive as naked exclusions. The distinction between “help
Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 380–81 (1973). A footnote of the
opinion also disposed of a constitutional claim related to the newspaper’s disclaimer:
Pittsburgh Press also argues that the Ordinance violates due process in that
there is no rational connection between sex-designated column headings and
sex discrimination in employment. It draws attention to a disclaimer which
it runs at the beginning of each of the “Jobs—Male Interest” and “Jobs—
Female Interest” columns . . . .
. . . . 
It suffices to dispose of this contention by noting that the Commission’s
commonsense recognition that the two are connected is supported by evi-
dence in the present record. The Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex of the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reflect a
similar conclusion.
Id. at n. 7.
116. Pittsburgh Press, 287 A.2d at 169.
117. The Evening Sentinel v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 357 A.2d 498, 503 (Conn. 1975).
118. Id. at 500.
119. Pittsburgh Press Co., 287 A.2d at 168, 171.
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wanted men” and “help wanted men only, no women” is nuga-
tory. . . . The [Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act] oper-
ates to eliminate not only the unjustified exclusion of people from
occupations, but also the practices leading to and facilitating
such discrimination.120
Thus, notwithstanding the independent duty of employers to consider
all jobseekers on a non-discriminatory basis, the mere framing of some
jobs as “male” or “female” was held to be a restriction that offended the
notion of fair employment.121
Courts’ finding of a per se violation is remarkable in part
because mere sex-segregated framing does not qualify as disparate
treatment.122 An employer who asks (via the advertisement) all appli-
cants whether they prefer a “man’s job” or a “woman’s job” and who
proceeds to then evaluate applicants for either job without regard to
the applicants’ sex is not treating applicants differently because of
their sex.123 Nonetheless, the courts universally struck down the mere
gendered advertisement as a civil rights violation, often explicitly in-
voking revulsion to a linguistic version of the Plessy principle: “The
‘separate but equal’ principle is no longer a legitimate argument in
civil rights cases.”124 The demise of sex-segregated advertisement is
also remarkable because in the space of a few short years, a long-
standing practice of dozens of newspapers across the country was
amended without substantial court involvement.125 As Elizabeth
Boyer summarized in 1971:
While it seems improbable that Congress intended enforcement of
a federal statute to depend on state and municipal human rela-
tions and civil rights commissions, these groups at the present
120. The Evening Sentinel, 357 A.2d at 504 (emphasis added). In his dissent, Justice
MacDonald (no relation to McDonald’s) disagreed in terms reminiscent of the decision
letter dismissing our 2009 complaint:
At the calculated risk of being accused of male chauvinism, I must observe
that I consider this particular controversy nothing more than a tempest in a
teapot that raises such ridiculous overtones as to call for some equally ridic-
ulous observations. I do not consider it discrimination, for example, but merely
a convenience to job hunters, to place under a “Help Wanted Male” heading
the advertisement of a carnival for a strong man, of the Pittsburgh Steelers
for a linebacker, or of a dramatic producer for a Winston Churchill. I con-
sider equally nonobjectionable to a potential National Organization for Men
the placing under a “Help Wanted Female” caption the carnival’s ad for a
bearded lady, a nightclub’s ad for a topless dancer or the ad of a dramatic pro-
ducer for a Lady Godiva or Cleopatra.
Id. at 506 (MacDonald, J. dissenting).
121. Id. at 504 (majority opinion).
122. Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2113.
123. Pittsburgh Press, 287 A.2d at 165.
124. Id. at 168.
125. Boyer, supra note 106, at 226.
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time seem to be accomplishing more, as a practical matter, than
are the more traditional forms of adversary proceedings under the
federal statute.126
This brief history is relevant to our “boy’s toy or girl’s toy” claim
because it shows both that merely gendered framing of contractual
solicitations can constitute discrimination and that state human rights
commissions can take a leading role in altering what was theretofore
commonplace industry behavior.127
V. THE LIMITS OF SEX-SEGREGATED MARKETING
McDonald’s 2008 Position Statement defended a practice—
namely, asking whether consumers prefer a “boy’s toy” or “girl’s
toy”—that we found, as an empirical matter, to be nonexistent in our
2013 sample.128 Nonetheless, the practice of what might be called
“sex-segregated marketing” is alive and well in a variety of online and
physical markets.129 Amazon.com eschews gendered classification
of its toy offerings, choosing instead to provide the following top
level categories130:
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also Pittsburgh Press., 287 A.2d at 169.
128. See Position Statement, supra note 55, at 7.
129. See Elizabeth Sweet, Guys and Dolls No More?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/12/23/opinion/sunday/gender-based-toy-marketing-returns
.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/R444-G66V (noting that “gender segregation” in toy
ads has “grown to unprecedented levels”).
130. AMAZON (Sep. 16, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/20130916040807/http://www
.amazon.com/toys/b?ie=UTF8&node=165793011, archived at http://perma.cc/ZW53-XS3N
(accessing authors image by searching for Amazon Toys & Games in the Internet Archive
index).
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Note how the picture accompanying the “Construction & Blocks”
category features a pink castle, an image stereotypically associated
with girls, for what otherwise might be considered stereotypically a
“boy’s” category.131 But ToysRUs.com guides potential customers with
sex-segregated menu titles132:
And as the Position Statement explicitly argued, department stores,
cosmetic companies and clothing retailers frequently segregate their
offerings into “men’s” and “women’s” categories.133 We take it as be-
yond argument that many of these practices fall outside the prohibi-
tion of public accommodation law.134 It turns out that Anna’s initial
intuition that marketing jobs as for men or women is likely action-
able, but marketing perfume or shoes as for men or for women is
likely not.135
Given the different positive laws concerning sex-segregated
marketing, it is natural to ask whether there are principled distinc-
tions between contexts where sex-segregated marketing is illegal (e.g.,
employment advertisements) and contexts where sex-segregated
marketing is legal (e.g., adult clothing advertisements).136 Beyond tech-
nical legal distinctions,137 we focus on three context-distinguishing
131. Id.; see also Sweet, supra note 129.
132. TOYS “R” US (June 26, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/20130626061014/http://
www.toysrus.com/shop/index.jsp?categoryId=2255956, archived at http://perma.cc/L3W9
-UFEY (accessing authors image by searching for ToysRUs in the Internet Archive index).
133. See Position Statement, supra note 55, at 6 (“Under [Ian Ayres’s and Anna Ayres-
Brown’s] proposed reading, department stores would run afoul of the law by keeping
dresses and skirts only in women’s sections or carrying blouses only in women’s sizes.
Cosmetic companies could be sued if their employees failed to offer a splash of perfume
(marketed specifically to women) to men passing by in the mall. Clothing retailers could
no longer organize their websites to differentiate between men’s and women’s apparel.”).
134. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (2012).
135. See Pittsburgh Press, 287 A.2d at 169.
136. See Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1257, 1260 n.25 (2003) (discussing Title VII and the ambiguous
scope of its singular exception, which allows gender-discrimination only if an employer
shows that such selectivity is a bona fide occupational qualification [BFQP] necessary in
the ordinary operation of the specific operation in question).
137. McDonald’s might have made four possible arguments. First, the public accommo-
dation statute in Connecticut prohibits denial because of your sex. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46a-64(a)(l). In this regard, McDonald’s would not have technically discriminated against
the drive-through customer, but the customer’s child instead. But query whether courts
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characteristics concerning: First, the strength and legitimacy of cus-
tomer preferences for sex-segregated categories; Second, the exis-
tence of less restrictive alternatives; and, Third, the likelihood of
cognizable harms to suggest that, as a positive matter, most tribu-
nals might have difficulty enjoining sex-segregated marketing of
Happy Meal toys.
The preference of the customers themselves for the sex-segre-
gated labeling would likely push courts toward countenancing the
practice. While courts often deny the importance of consumer pref-
erences to establish bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs),138
deeply rooted preferences implicitly undergird privacy BFOQs139 and
might analogously support sex-segregated framings.140 Finding gender-
specific labels convenient is different than having a gendered prefer-
ence for particular items, but the two are related.141 Since most men
and women prefer different kinds of shoes,142 it makes it more con-
venient for them to search for stores or departments that highlight
would countenance such a practice and outcome. A court would likely hold, for example,
that choosing one applicant over another due to the sex of the applicant’s child constitutes
discrimination under Title VII. Id. Second, McDonald’s could have argued that there was
no denial of goods to begin with under the Connecticut public accommodation statute. Id.
While the “boy’s toy or girl’s toy” question is not in itself a denial, it might still nevertheless
constitute a prohibited restriction. See Boyer, supra note 106, at 224 (analyzing EEOC
guidelines which indicate that a limitation based on sex could still violate Title VII). Third,
as the Position Statement itself suggested, a franchisor could not be responsible for the
discriminatory actions of its employees. See Position Statement, supra note 55, at 3
(noting that the store manager trains employees to ask customers who order a Happy
Meal whether they want a “boy’s toy” or a “girl’s toy”). However, it is well established in
civil rights jurisprudence that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies, thus rendering
a franchisor liable for the discriminatory actions of its employees. See Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) (holding that an employer may be vicariously
liable for a supervisor’s discriminatory actions, subject to an affirmative defense based on
the reasonableness of the employer’s and plaintiff victim’s conduct). Lastly, McDonald’s
might have argued that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the public accom-
modation statute. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to decide whether
plaintiffs may bring disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), so the
last argument may be persuasive. Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action,
658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted.
138. See Kapczynski, supra note 136, at 1260 n.25 (noting that the Second Circuit, in
Forts v. Ward, denied a sex-based BFOQ for prison guards working nights shifts in a
women’s prison dorm).
139. See id. at 1277 (“[S]ame-sex privacy may be a customer preference, but Title VII
should defer to it because it is a really strong customer preference. As Lex Larson’s
treatise puts it, ‘[G]iving respect to deep-seated feelings of personal privacy involving
one’s own genital areas is quite a different matter from catering to the desire of some male
airline passengers to have a little diluted sexual titillation from the hovering presence
of an attractive female flight attendant.’ ”).
140. Id.
141. See Jess, Let Clothes be Clothes?, LET TOYS BE TOYS (June 4, 2014), http://www
.lettoysbetoys.org.uk/let-clothes-be-clothes/, archived at http://perma.cc/36UW-XKW8.
142. But see Kinky Boots, BROADWAY.COM http://www.broadway.com/shows/kinky-boots
/story/, archived at http://perma.cc/6NL4-4JRX (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
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whether the collection is comprised of “men’s” or “women’s” footwear.
As applied to Happy Meals, a customer preference for sex-segregated
labeling might come from either children or their parents. A (male
or female) child who has never heard of the “Justice” brand might
make a superior decision by choosing between a “boy’s” or “girl’s” toy
option. Or more prosaically harried parents in the drive-through
line may prefer the “boy’s or girl’s” toy framing because it flattens
discretion and avoids a child’s dawdling consideration of choosing
between a Digi Sport game or Hello Kitty watch toys.
The strength and legitimacy of customer preferences will in part
be a function of the next best non-gendered label that the store might
have deployed. The reasonableness of men’s or women’s fragrances
is undermined if it might be linguistically feasible to alternatively
label the counters as “perfume” and “cologne.” Amazon’s ability to
successfully market non-gendered categories (Action Figures, Dolls,
Arts & Crafts, Construction & Blocks, etc.) weakens the linguistic
convenience argument that ToysRUs or McDonald’s might make.143
McDonald’s might have instead used the categories “mostly preferred
by boys” and “mostly preferred by girls.” While still gendered, the
“mostly preferred” label is less segregating because it at least ac-
knowledges preference variation within each gender.144 Just as
BFOQs have been denied in employment when a less discriminatory
alternative exists,145 courts might have more difficulty accepting the
utility of sex-segregated labels when effective non-gendered or less
gendered categories exist.
Finally, courts are more likely to find a violation when the per-
ceived harms of sex-segregation are more pronounced.146 The prac-
tice of asking whether the customer prefers a “boy’s toy” or “girl’s
toy” introduces two distinct types of harms: one that imposes a gen-
dered structure that artificially defines what it means to be a male or
female and another that potentially forces children to deny their per-
sonal identity.147 With respect to the harm of gendered socialization,
the Pittsburgh Press decision, which struck down sex-segregated
newspaper want-ad headings, emphasized that the advertisements
were a gateway to employment and the “economic security and stabil-
ity [that] are essential to the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness.”148
143. See AMAZON, supra note 130.
144. See Regulating Opt-Out, supra note 19, at 2037 (talking about variations in speci-
ficity of altering rules).
145. Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1370-72 (11th Cir. 1982).
146. See Kapczynski, supra note 136, at 1282, 1292.
147. See Sweet, supra note 129.
148. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 287 A.2d 161, 
168 (Pa. Commw 1972).
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In contrast, the denial of one’s preferred Happy Meal toy when con-
sidered as a physical object ranks as one of the most trivial of mate-
rial deprivations.149 But in considering the harms of sex-segregated
marketing (and the more express forms of disparate treatment un-
covered in our counter tests), it is standard for courts to consider not
just the material harms, but the symbolic harms of defendant’s
discrimination.150 The labeling of toys as for boys or girls calls forth
stereotypes of what it means to be male or female.151 The sex-segre-
gated framing does not just reflect current preferences, but it also
reinforces a symbolic order of gender that has discriminatory effects
upon children.152 When the McDonald’s employee at the drive-through
presumed that girls would prefer a Justice toy because it was pink
and that boys would prefer a Power Ranger toy because it was
“mechanical,”153 she implicitly cast girls and boys in gender-defined
roles.154 McDonald’s marketing practices “insinuate that children’s
genders define their interests.”155 The discriminatory result here was
in characterizing girls as constitutively interested in fashion (as the
employee phrased it, “girl’s stuff” such as bracelets) and boys as con-
stitutively interested in construction and building.156 By deciding that
“boys should like fighting and girls should like fashion, the restau-
rant singles out children who don’t satisfy McDonalds’ standards for
what is ‘normal.’”157
The provision of toys is certainly less connected than employment
to economic security, but if “[p]lay is the [c]hild’s [w]ork,” then toys are
important tools through which they come to learn about the world.158
To understand the potential harm of sex-segregated marketing, we
149. McDonald’s Position Statement makes clear early on that they viewed our stance
as “frivolous.” See Position Statement, supra note 55, at 1.
150. Evening Sentinel v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 357 A.2d 498, 504 (Conn. 1975)
(“Symbolic discrimination as in the instant case is every bit as restrictive as naked
exclusions.”). The court also observed that the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices
Act seeks to eliminate subtle as well as overt forms of discrimination. See id.
151. See Sweet, supra note 129.
152. See Kapczynski, supra note 136, at 1261–62 (“Same-sex privacy cases . . . reinforce
a symbolic order of gender that has a discriminatory effect upon women . . . .”).
153. See supra Part III.
154. Antonia Rose Ayres-Brown, Purchase and Prejudice at 41 (unpublished manuscript,
2013) (on file with authors); see also Sweet, supra note 129.
155.  Ayres-Brown, supra note 154, at 41.
156. See id. at 1; see also Kapczynski, supra note 136, at 1261-62 (explaining that a dis-
criminatory effect may, for example, involve casting women to fit within gender norms).
157. Ayres-Brown, supra note 154, at 2.
158. As Jean Piaget suggested, children’s play is an expression of “pure assimilation—
the process by which the child transforms the world to meet his or her personal needs.”
David Elkind, Thinking about Children’s Play, CHILD CARE INFO. EXCHANGE, May 2001,
at 27–28.
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must measure not only the impact of the labels on gendered norms,
but also “the kinds of legal subjects that these norms call forth.”159
Beyond the reinforcing or reifying of gendered identities, McDonald’s
practices of forcing children or parents often in the presence of their
children to choose between a “boy’s toy” or “girl’s toy” occasions a more
personal, localized harm on the children.160 To respond to a “boy’s toy
or girl’s toy” question literally calls upon customers to actively give
voice to this gendered labeling.161 In contrast to the perfume counter
or the shoe store, where customer may see the sign “women’s” or
“men’s” but need not mirror those gendered terms in order to receive
the desired product, customers at the drive-through—often without
notice of the underlying toy themes—have to say that they want a
“boy’s toy” or “girl’s toy.” McDonald’s practice, thereby, singles out
children who do not satisfy their standards for each gender’s interests.
The second kind of harm that can flow from McDonald’s practices
thus lies in compelling a child to pigeonhole himself or herself into
a sexual category based on a toy choice or having a child hear the
parent make this rigid categorization.162 McDonald’s question harms
children who may have heterodox preferences, those not necessarily
aligned with McDonald’s gendered framing of its toys.163 McDonald’s
own reply points to the disjunction that some children might feel be-
tween what gender they internally identify as and a social label im-
posed by the external world, when it acknowledged that asking for
an opposite-sexed toy might produce “social awkwardness.”164
Kenji Yoshino has powerfully identified the costs associated
with the “outing” or “covering” of identity.165 The “boy’s toy” or “girl’s
toy” question creates these costs for children with heterodox prefer-
ences or their parents because they must either bear the costs of cov-
ering their true preferences and presenting an assimilated preference
by asking for the same-sex toy.166 The covering child downplays the
child’s heterodox preference by implicitly accepting McDonald’s gen-
dered norms (Justice bracelets are for girls, while Power Ranger action
figures are for boys) while also ordering the child’s true preference for
159. See Kapczynski, supra note 136, at 1283–84.
160. See Ayres-Brown, supra note 154, at 1.
161. Id.
162. See Jess, supra note 141.
163. Id.
164. Reply, Ayres, CHRO No. 0930361 at 3 (Conn. Comm’n on Human Rights and
Opportunities 2009).
165. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 775–76 (2002)[hereinafter Yoshino,
Covering].
166. Id. at 772.
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a gender-opposite toy.167 Encouraging this kind of gendered assimila-
tion, the “boy’s toy” or “girl’s toy” question fails to accommodate and
recognize the complexity of a child’s personal identity.168 Alternatively,
the child with heterodox preferences can bear the costs of publicly
“outing” themselves by declaring that they prefer toys that were
designed for a different sex.169 In either circumstance, McDonald’s
“boy’s” or “toy’s” couching of preferences gives artificially gendered
meaning to toys that can run counter to the ultimate identity of a
child and needlessly reminds children and their parents that their
toy preferences run counter to gendered social expectations.170
At the end of the day, one can still easily imagine reasonable
readers thinking that legally prohibiting the “boy’s toy or girl’s toy”
question is a bridge too far. Our evidence of default counter discrim-
ination and refusals to deal are troubling, but it is just “a tempest in
a teapot” to complain about “sex-segregated” marketing.171 Any in-
conveniences from having to respond to a gendered toy question are
“so trivial that . . . . the time-honored maxim ‘de minimis non curat
lex’ applies.”172 Some readers may even worry that a small-scale social
science study about toy choice might serve to trivialize the commands
of our civil rights laws. At least in one instance, however, a small-scale
social science study about toy choice was seen to illuminate the harms
of discrimination.173 In Brown vs. Board of Education, the Supreme
Court cited to a doll study conducted by Kenneth and Mamie Clark
which found that many black children preferred playing with white
dolls to black dolls.174 While the focus of our study is markedly differ-
ent, the Clark study reminds us that children’s choices of play things
can reflect the residue of discrimination in society more generally.175
167. See id.
168. As Yoshino observes, certain outsider groups such as religious minorities and people
with disabilities have a “formal legal right to accommodation.” KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING:
THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 167 (Random House, 1st ed. 2006) [hereinafter
YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT]. Theoretically, accommodation would be the
solution to “coerced covering.” Id. at 168.
169. See Yoshino, Covering, supra note 165, at 775.
170. YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT, supra note 168, at xi–xii.
171. Evening Sentinel v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 357 A.2d 498, 506 (Conn. 1975)
(MacDonald, J., dissenting).
172. See, e.g., McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 203 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (“There may
be inconveniences so trivial that they are most properly ignored. In this respect, this area
of the law is no different from any others in which the time-honored maxim ‘de minimis
non curat lex’ applies”).
173. See Kenneth B. Clark, NNDB: TRACKING THE ENTIRE WORLD, http://www.nndb.com
/people/883/000115538/, archived at http://perma.cc/3QXM-9EGZ (last visited Jan 28, 2015).
174. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. Of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494, 494 n.11 (1954).
175. See Clark, supra note 173.
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CONCLUSION: AN OPEN LETTER TO DONALD THOMPSON,
THE CEO OF MCDONALD’S
On October 8, 2013, one of us mailed the following letter with a
draft of this Essay to Donald Thompson, the Chief Executive Officer
of McDonald’s:
Dear Mr. Thompson,
Five years ago, I wrote to your predecessor, Jim Skinner,
and asked him to address McDonald’s gender-classified
Happy Meal toys. I explained the harmfulness of the toys’
sexist connotations and hurtful implications.
A customer satisfaction representative responded and
explained that:
When we offer a happy meal with two different
themes, our employees have been specifically
trained to ask customers which of the two toys of-
fered that week they would like, and not whether
they would like a “girl” toy or a “boy” toy.
As described in the enclosed essay, my father and I found
both in 2008 and again in 2013 that McDonald’s employees
rarely comply with this training. Our recent testing uncov-
ered troubling evidence of sex discrimination:
Do you care that 93.30% of drive-through employ-
ees, instead of asking drive-through customers
ordering a Happy Meal about their toy preference,
asked the customer for the sex of the customer’s
child (“Is it for a boy or a girl?” or simply “boy or
girl?”)?
Do you care that one of your franchises openly
flouts your professed corporate policy and claims in
its Position Statement to a Human Rights Commis-
sion that it trains its employees “to ask customers
who order a Happy Meal whether they would pre-
fer a ‘girl’ toy or a ‘boy’ toy”?
Do you care that 92.9% of counter employees with-
out asking a child about her or his toy preference
just gave the toy that the store had designated for
that child’s gender?
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Do you care that 42.8% of stores refused to offer
opposite-sex toys even after the child re-approached
the counter and affirmatively asked for an alter-
native?
Do you care that a McDonald’s employee refused
to offer an in-stock Power Ranger toy to one girl
even after she had twice asked for a “boy’s toy?”
Do you care the employee likely lied to her about
not having any boy’s toys because of her sex? Do
you care that your workers are willing to compro-
mise their integrity in order to conform a child’s
interests to that child’s sex’s stereotypes?
And if you do care, what will you do about it?176 Will
you be willing to take affirmative steps to help ensure that
your professed corporate policy is in fact followed by your
franchisees?
My father and I applaud the healthy food changes you’ve
made to the Happy Meal since we conducted our original
study. But we are disturbed by your company’s continued
sex-segregated marketing practice. It is more than a little
ironic that boys in our 2013 visits encountered such diffi-
culty obtaining both literal and figurative Justice. We do not
intend to file suit over our recent new filings. However, we
stand ready to help you in any way that we can—including
giving you a platform to state your views—to grapple with
the issue of “sex-segregated” labeling.
Sincerely,
Anna Ayres-Brown177
On December 17, 2013, we were heartened to receive this reply:
Dear Ms. Ayres-Brown,
Your letter to Don Thompson dated October 8, 2013 has
been directed to me for response. I want to thank you for
your letter and for raising your concern about the manner
in which our Happy Meal toys were distributed to customers
in certain of our McDonald’s restaurants.
176. If you’re skeptical about whether employees actually did these things at your res-
taurants, we’d be happy to provide recordings of our interactions.
177. Letter from Anna Ayres-Brown to Don Thompson, Chief Executive Officer,
McDonald’s, (Oct. 8, 2013) (on file with authors).
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We take your concern seriously. It is McDonald’s inten-
tion and goal that each customer who desires a Happy Meal
toy be provided the toy of his or her choice, without any
classification of the toy as a “boy” or “girl” toy and without
any reference to the customer’s gender. We have recently
reexamined our internal guidelines, communications and
practices and are making improvements to better ensure
that our toys are distributed consistent with our policy.
I hope you can appreciate the even with additional com-
munication and training and improvements to our processes,
it may take some time to fully see the results of our efforts
in more than 14,000 restaurants in the U.S. It is our inten-
tion to continue to monitor to ensure that our policy is
being implemented and followed throughout our system.
We again appreciate the time you took to bring this
matter to our attention.
Yours very truly,
Patricia Harris
Chief Diversity Officer178
McDonald’s corporate response is all that we might have
wished. What’s more, as this article was being edited for publica-
tion, DoSomething.org posted this photo that a McDonald’s manager
posted at McDonald’s store to inform employees of the new no “boy
or girl” toy policy179:
178. Letter from Patricia Harris, Chief Diversity Officer, McDonald’s, to Anna Ayres-
Brown (Dec. 17, 2013), available at http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/McDonalds_Letter
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QK5Q-M2LS.
179. Print, Persuade and Post, supra note 10; see also Ayres-Brown, Went to the CEO,
supra note 77.
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This photo shows that McDonalds is trying. We acknowledge
that there are surely limits to a franchisor’s ability to control the
“more than 14,000 restaurants in the U.S.”180 As we move forward,
crowdsourcing may be the easiest way to assess whether the fran-
chisor’s best intentions are being put into franchisee practice.181 Any
reader can simply order a Happy Meal to find out. We have included
a hyperlink below where you can report your experience, and if you
would like to help us crowd-source enforcement, we have provided
another link so that you can print a copy of McDonald’s official
policy.182 We have found that giving a copy to a store’s manager is
a powerful way to change behavior at the local level.
180. Letter from Patricia Harris, supra note 178. In response to a Freakonomics post
about this article, an anonymous commenter wrote:
As someone that works internally with McDonalds in the Happy Meal busi-
ness, I believe this change to gender-neutral customer prompting at the point
of sale is being rolled out nationally in the coming months. Some markets
are currently employing this policy, while others will be starting by July at
the latest. . . . 
. . . .
I would caution Freakonomics readers to be patient with compliance on this
change, at least until July.
Print, Persuade, and Post, supra note 10.
181. Print, Persuade, and Post, supra note 10.
182. You can report your experience for the next 5 years at http://survey.az1.qualtrics
.com/SE/?SID=SV_3vMabqZFfwQOrZ3, archived at, http://perma.cc/Q5RN-PKW6 (last
visited Jan. 28, 2015), and you can print a copy of the Diversity Officer’s letter at http://
islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/McDonalds_Letter.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QK5Q
-M2LS (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
